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Abstract Traditional agency theory predicts that when a large company is trading
solvently, shareholders will align their interests with those of the directors, but that
this may also mean that when the company is financially distressed, directors will
prefer shareholder interests to those of the creditors (even if there is no residual
value for the shareholders in the company). Both the law and the market respond to
this problem, and to date the situation has been held in some sort of approximate
balance. However, this article examines the consequences of alignment of share-
holder and director interests when a large private equity company is in financial
distress, in light of the debt restructuring which is likely to be in contemplation and
the type of director who is often retained. It argues that in these cases directors may
have an incentive to support creditors’ debt restructuring plans, and, paradoxically,
the closer the alignment of their interests and those of the shareholders when the
company is trading solvently, the greater this incentive to prefer creditors may be
(even if there is still a residual interest for the shareholders in the company). The
implications of this for the law and for the market are explored.
Keywords Directors’ duties  Insolvency  Debt restructuring  Board composition 
Private equity  Law and finance
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1 Introduction
Considerable ink has been spilt, over a considerable period of time, on the question of
whether, and the extent to which, the law should intervene to regulate the duties of
directors. Part of this literature focuses on so-called agency problems in large and larger
mid-cap companies. An agency problem may arise when a person (the principal) is
reliant on another (the agent) to perform some role on his behalf and the interests of the
principal and the agent diverge, so that the agent is notmotivated to act in the principal’s
best interest. The literature on agency problems in large (ordinarily publicly traded)
companies is itself divided into two distinct strands. First, the literature explores the
problemswhichmay arise if shareholder and directorial incentives are not alignedwhen
a solvent company is trading, the costs which this may generate and the role which the
law can play in reducing these costs by aligning shareholder and director interests.1 The
second strand of the literature explores agency problems which can arise between
shareholders and creditors when a company is in financial distress, the costs which can
arise and the role which the law can play in reducing these costs by protecting creditor
interests when there is doubt that all claims will be repaid.2
Most of the literature analyses the relativemerits of controlling directorial behaviour
in distress on the assumption that shareholderswill take steps to align their interests with
those of thedirectorswhen the company is trading solvently,with the result that directors
may prefer shareholder interests in financial distress. Indeed, in this view, the greater the
alignment of shareholder and director interests in good times, the greater the risk that
directors will prefer shareholder interests over creditor interests in financial distress,
even when shareholders have no residual economic interest in the company. Although
scholars disagree over the extent of the issue, the appropriate solutions to it, andwhether
other considerations prevail,3 most seem to consider it the issue at hand.
This article reveals a more complex account in modern financial markets and argues
that, in certain cases, directorial incentives nowmilitate against shareholder interests, in
favour of creditor-led restructuring plans and creditor interests in financial distress.
Moreover, and perhaps paradoxically, it argues that the greater the alignment of
shareholder and director interests in good times, the greater this preference for creditor-
led restructuring plans may be in distress. Using the English market as an example, it
develops a more nuanced account of agency problems and agency costs in modern debt
restructuring, implicating not only shareholders, directors and creditors but also
complex relationships between directors and shareholders, senior and junior financial
creditors, and (perhaps intuitively unlikely) director/shareholder/creditor alliances.
The article proceeds as follows. It begins with a review of the existing literature on
the shareholder-director incentive problem in publicly traded companies, and the
traditional English legal and market response. It explores how this relates to the so-
called shareholder-creditor agency problem which arises when one of these
1 For an excellent overview and analysis, see Enriques et al. (2009).
2 For an excellent overview and analysis, see Armour et al. (2009b).
3 In particular, as to whether the market mechanisms available to stakeholders to control for these agency
problems offer sufficient protection, or whether legal intervention is also necessary. See, e.g., Keay
(2003).
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companies is in financial distress, and the traditional response of English law and the
market to this issue. It then examines the private equity model of share ownership,
and analyses the impact of this model on directorial behaviour. It explores a more
complex web of shareholder/creditor/director relationships and revisits the connection
between the steps taken by shareholders to address agency problems in good times
and directorial incentives in distress. Having considered the impact of both the new
agency analysis and the new market environment on the traditional view, it makes
some recommendations for law and for the market. The article then concludes.
2 The Traditional View
2.1 The Shareholder-Director Agency Problem
In their seminal 1932book,Berle andMeans identified thewidespread dispersal of share
ownership in US firms, and the separation of the owners from themanagers who run the
businesses but have a negligible ownership interest in them.4 This wide dispersal of
share ownership occurs to a greater extent in some jurisdictions than in others, but it
occurs in all developed economies to some extent.5 Two problems present themselves.
First, an agency problemmay arise where shareholder and directorial incentives are not
aligned. Shareholders seek wealth in the stock market, while directors seek utility in the
labour market. Thus, directors may have a preference for ‘perks’ such as a fast car or
lavish client entertainment, for leisure activities rather than hard work (shirking), for a
lower level of risk than shareholders (because their human capital is all tied up in one
firm) or for different time preferences than shareholders (short-term rewards rather than
long-term return—although this last is controversial).6 Secondly, if share ownership is
dispersed, it gives rise to a problem of collective action in controlling the agent
directors.7 As soon as share ownership is spread amongst a wide group, different actors
may have different preferences, giving rise to a problem of coordination.
English company law offers a variety of mechanisms to deal with these agency
problems.8 For example, section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 provides that a
director must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole,
having regard to the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in the section. The
Companies Act also imposes other relevant duties on directors,9 and enables a
simple majority of shareholders to vote to remove a director.10 These rules seek to
incentivise directors to have regard for the interests of their principal (the
shareholders) in two ways: first, by threatening court-imposed sanctions if
4 Berle and Means (1932).
5 Wymeersch (2013), at p. 124.
6 This list is taken from Molho (1997), at pp. 120–121.
7 Olson (1971); Buchanan et al. (2004).
8 See Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman (2009a).
9 Companies Act 2006, s 171(b), s 172(1), s 173(1), s 174(1), s 175(1), s 176 and s 177.
10 Companies Act 2006, s 168.
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shareholder interests are ignored, and, secondly, by providing shareholders with the
power to remove recalcitrant directors.
Nonetheless, in practice, the English courts have remained reluctant to interfere
in commercial decision making on a number of grounds: that judges have neither
sufficient experience nor knowledge to decide commercial matters;11 that judicial
interference will slow up the pace of commerce; that it is important for the
commercial world to know that decisions which are reached will not be upset except
in the clearest of cases; and that commercial decision making often requires a
balancing exercise between competing considerations in which the court should not
interfere.12 Moreover, the Charterbridge test requires that, in determining whether
the director has acted in the best interests of the company, the English court will ask
itself whether the director acted in what the director, rather than the court, thought to
be in the best interests of the company, and that the question for the court to
consider is whether the director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the
best interests of the company. Only if the director failed to turn his mind to a
relevant factor, or the court does not believe the director’s assertions, will it apply
an objective standard.13 Thus, often, ‘law stays at the margins of what boards are
doing by focusing on formalities, process and liability’,14 so that there are limits to
the effectiveness of English commercial law in eliminating agency problems.
Exercise of shareholder powers such as removal, on the other hand, requires both
coordination and observation of the behaviour complained of. Both of these may
prove challenging.
As a result, shareholders in large corporates in England have not relied entirely
on the law to control agency problems, but have developed their own mechanisms to
influence directorial behaviour. Two of these are particularly relevant to our
account. First, large listed companies do not necessarily seek directors based on
particular industry expertise, but rather based on their skills in communicating with
investors and the market.15 Indeed, on his appointment, Dave Lewis, the current
Chief Executive of the English supermarket chain Tesco, proudly announced ‘I’ve
never run a shop in my life’.16 Executive directors in large UK listed companies are
often what we might call ‘professional’ directors: directors who do not see their
career progression in terms of a particular sector or business, but rather in terms of
progressing through the ranks of listed companies. A small group of so-called
institutional investors (mainly pension funds and insurance companies) has
traditionally exerted substantial control over these listed company directors.17
Although the mix of shareholders in listed corporate Britain is changing rapidly,
already encompassing a far more diverse range of institutional shareholders, such as
11 Lesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch); [2010] BCC 420, at [85].
12 Cobden Investments Limited v RWM Langport Ltd, Southern Counties Fresh Foods Limited, Romford
Wholesale Meats Limited [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch), at [754].
13 Charterbridge Corp. Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1969] 3 WLR 122.
14 Winter and Van de Loo (2013), at p. 228.
15 Stapledon (1996), at pp. 101–106 and 117–121.
16 Wood (2014).
17 Stapledon (1996), at pp. 33–53.
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overseas investors, hedge funds, activist investors, sovereign wealth funds and
others,18 a core group of institutional domestic shareholders remains a regular
investor in the market.19 Directors of UK listed companies expect to have repeated
interactions with these key players throughout their professional lives, and to focus
on their reputation with this influential cohort.20 Thus, concern for reputation in the
market for directors strongly incentivises the UK listed company executive director
to focus on shareholder value.
UK listed companies also retain professional, non-executive directors (in the
literature often referred to as ‘independent’ or ‘outside’ directors). These directors
are appointed for the purpose of remaining independent of those involved in the
management of the firm.21 They will usually have a portfolio of interests and will
perform this role on each of the boards on which they sit. These non-executive
directors are also highly motivated by concerns for their reputation with
shareholders. They expect to rotate through a number of appointments as they
vacate seats on boards at the end of their term, and are dependent on reputation for
their ability to gain another appointment. In the listed company space, given that
directors are likely to be dependent on the chairman and chief executive for an
appointment,22 a record of looking after shareholder interests is likely to be an
essential qualification for recruitment. They are also likely to serve on other boards
and to be concerned with reputation insofar as it affects their other positions.
The secondmarket controlmechanism for the shareholder/director agency problem
relevant to this account is close alignment of incentives through pay. There are two
principal forms of incentive alignment through pay. The first is to continue to pay the
director in cash, but to tie a percentage of the pay package to results (performance pay).
The second is to give managers shares in the company in addition to salary and cash
bonuses.23 In this way, management’s incentives are aligned closely with those of the
shareholder body, and management is motivated to act in the shareholders’ best
interests. Although executive compensation generally, and equity compensation
schemes in particular, have recently been the subject of critical enquiry andmay create
their own agency issues in healthy companies,24 they remain an important plank in the
bastion against directorial self-interest.25 In their path-finding work in the 1970s,
Jensen and Meckling described the sum of reputational bonding and monitoring
expenditure, and the residual loss which arises to the extent that directorial self-
interested behaviour is not completely eliminated, as ‘agency costs’.26
18 Office for National Statistics (2012).
19 Wymeersch (2013), at p. 115.
20 Stapledon (1996), at pp. 79–154, provides a detailed account of institutional shareholder involvement
in the UK.
21 Hansmann et al. (2009), at p. 55.
22 Stapledon (1996), at pp. 139 and 143.
23 Molho (1997), at p. 122, listing a system of bonuses, profit sharing, profit-related pay, payment by
commission or linking pay to the company share price.
24 Bebchuk et al. (2002), at pp. 751–846; Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
25 Bozzi et al. (2013), at p. 298.
26 Jensen and Meckling (1976), at p. 304.
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2.2 The Shareholder-Creditor Agency Problem
Close alignment of shareholder and directorial interest through reputational bonding
and incentive pay generates another agency problem, this time between sharehold-
ers and creditors, when a company is distressed.27 When the company faces
financial trouble, directors’ alignment with shareholder interests may cause them to
take ever more reckless action in an attempt to turn things around: action which may
also be in the best interests of shareholders, who have no residual interest in the
company if it becomes insolvent, but which will not be in the best interests of
creditors. This excessively risky behaviour may impose costs on the company and
its creditors if it is not eliminated.
English common law responds to this problem by imposing a shift in the duties of
directors, when a company is financially distressed, from acting in the best interests
of shareholders towards acting in the interests of creditors.28 Whilst the compar-
atively recently codified duties of directors of a company incorporated in England
and Wales require the directors to promote the success of the company for the
benefit of its members, section 172(3) of the Companies Act 2006 preserves the
common law requirements to consider the interests of creditors when the firm is
distressed.29 The English common law position is supported by statute, particularly
section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Company Directors Disqualification
Act 1986. Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, known as the wrongful trading
test, provides that a director may be personally liable if he should have known that
the company had arrived at the point at which there was no reasonable prospect it
would avoid insolvent liquidation, and he did not then take every step with a view to
minimising potential loss to creditors.30 The standard prescribed is that of the
reasonable director, enhanced by any particular knowledge, skill and experience that
director may have.31 The disqualification regime threatens miscreant directors with
disqualification from acting as a director for a period of between 2 and 15 years.32
Once again there are significant enforcement challenges. Insofar as the common
law duties are concerned, the English courts have continued to be aware of the risk
of intervention in commercial decision making, not only for all the reasons already
identified but also, in this area, specifically because of the risk of hindsight bias.
27 Ibid., at p. 345.
28 See Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd [1980] 1 W.L.R 627; Re Horsley & Weight Ltd [1982] 3 All
E.R. 1045; Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Ltd [1986] 1 W.L.R 1512; Brady v Brady (1988)
3 B.C.C. 535; Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd (1988) 4 B.C.C 30; Facia Footwear Ltd (in
administration) v Hinchliffe [1998] 1 B.C.L.C 218; Re Pantone 485 Ltd [2002] 1 B.C.L.C 266; Colin
Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2002] EWHC 2748 (Ch); [2003] 2 B.C.L.C
153; MDA Investment Management Ltd [2003] EWHC 2277 (Ch); [2005] B.C.C 783; Bilta (UK) Ltd v
Nzir [2015] UKSC 23; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 1168, at [123]–[126].
29 Providing that the duty to promote the success of the company ‘has effect subject to any enactment or
rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of
the company’.
30 Insolvency Act 1986 s. 214(2) and (3).
31 Insolvency Act 1986 s. 214(4).
32 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s. 6(4).
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Thus, they have commented that it is not the function of the court to second-guess
the decisions which businessmen take in the moment,33 and have made clear that
they will approach the duties of directors of a financially distressed company in the
same way as the Charterbridge approach discussed above.34 In other words,
provided the director adduces evidence that he was acting in good faith, and turned
his mind to the question of creditor interests, the decision will not be impugned.
Moreover, it is not clear precisely when the duty to creditors arises,35 and, when it
does arise, whether it supplants or joins the duty to shareholders.36
Furthermore, in the case of wrongful trading, it is challenging to establish when
the duty to avoid wrongful trading arises, what it is that the directors should
conclude and how the ‘reasonable prospect’ test should be applied, so that in reality
great weight will be put on the written record for the purposes of assessing liability
under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Moreover, the general approach to
contribution appears to be compensatory rather than penal and, until recently, claims
were limited to only certain types of office holder (liquidators) who frequently faced
practical difficulties in raising finance to bring a claim, so that the benefits of a claim
might not easily be said to outweigh the risks.37 Notwithstanding reform in the
Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, extending the ability of
liquidators to bring wrongful trading claims to administrators (another type of
33 Re Sherborne Associates Ltd [1995] B.C.C 40, at [54].
34 Re Regentcrest plc v Cohen [2001] 2 B.C.L.C 80, at [120].
35 The cases have variously described the duty as arising when the company is of ‘doubtful solvency’ (Re
Horsely & Weight Ltd [1982] 3 All E.R. 1045, at [442]; Brady v Brady (1987) 3 BCC 535 at 552; Colin
Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2002] EWHC 2748 (Ch); [2003] 2 B.C.L.C
153, at [74]); ‘near-insolvent’ (The Liquidator of Wendy Fair (Heritage) Ltd v Hobday [2006] EWHC
5803, at [66]); ‘on the verge of insolvency’ (Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse)
Ltd [2002] EWHC 2748 (Ch); [2003] 2 B.C.L.C 153, at [74]); ‘bordering on insolvency’ (Bilta (UK) Ltd
v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 1168, at [123]); in a ‘very dangerous financial position’ or
‘parlous financial state’ (Facia Footwear (in administration) v Hinchcliffe [1998] 1 B.C.L.C 218); or in a
‘precarious’ financial position (Re MDA Investment Management Ltd [2003] EWHC 2277 (Ch); [2005]
B.C.C 783, at [75]).
36 It appears that when the company is insolvent, the creditors’ interests override the interests of the
shareholders, and even before the onset of insolvency, English law mandates a strong shift towards
creditor interests. In Re MDA Investment Management Ltd [2003] EWHC 2277 (Ch); [2005] B.C.C 783,
at [70], Mr Justice Park indicated that when a company is in financial difficulties, although not insolvent,
‘the duties which the directors owe to the company are extended so as to encompass the interests of the
company’s creditors as a whole, as well as those of the shareholders’. Mr Justice Lewison took a similar
approach in Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch), at [1304]. In Bilta (UK) Ltd v
Nazir [2015] UKSC 23; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 1168, Lord Toulson and Lord Hodge rather ambiguously stated
that when the company is insolvent or bordering on insolvency, the directors must have ‘proper regard’
for the interests of the company’s creditors, and, later, that the interests of the company ‘are not to be
treated as synonymous with those of the shareholders but rather embracing those of the creditors’. But
other cases have indicated that creditors’ interests are ‘paramount’, and not only when a company is
insolvent but also when it is doubtfully solvent (Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf
(Limehouse) Ltd [2002] EWHC 2748 (Ch); [2003] 2 B.C.L.C 153, at [74]; Roberts v Frohlich [2011]
EWHC (Ch) 257; [2012] BCC 407, at [85] and [94]; GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo [2012] EWHC 61, at
[165]; Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd [2013] EWHC 2876, at [92]), and at least one leading English
Queen’s Counsel has suggested that this best summarises the current position in English law (Arnold
(2015), at p. 51).
37 For a more detailed review of the enforcement challenges, see, e.g., Keay (2005a).
The Paradox of Alignment: Agency Problems and Debt… 503
123
insolvency office holder) and entitling office holders to sell wrongful trading claims,
scholars wonder whether incentives to bring claims will be increased.38
We also find the disqualification regime beset with enforcement challenges.
Disqualification is a state-enforced regime but the Secretary of State is reliant on
information from office holders in deciding whether to act.39 Office holders, in their
turn, have limited incentives to be pro-active given that no proceeds for the estate
flow from a successful disqualification.40 Judges have exhibited disqualification
reticence in all but the most serious of cases (particularly where negligence is
implicated),41 and questions have been raised about governmental resources to
pursue disqualification cases.42 Significant reforms to this regime are also being
introduced through the Deregulation Act 2015 and the Small Business, Enterprise
and Employment Act 2015,43 although some of the underlying problems continue to
subsist.
Nonetheless, whatever the odds of a successful claim, the professional executive
or non-executive director in a UK listed company is unlikely to regard the risk of
censure worth the putative benefit of excessively risky behaviour. Even judicial or
state criticism is likely to have a significant impact on the ability for directors in this
group to find work. Thus, whatever the enforcement weaknesses of the common law
and statutory regime, the professional director is likely to take the regime seriously
so that it will influence corporate governance in UK listed companies in periods of
financial distress.44 Listed company directors are also likely to be well advised, and
will thus be well informed about the legal rules and their legal responsibilities. For
all these reasons, directors of UK listed companies are likely to be mindful of their
legal obligations to creditors in financial distress, to some extent addressing
shareholder-creditor agency problems.
Given, however, that English corporate law does not eliminate the shareholder-
creditor agency problem completely, creditors have developed their own market
mechanisms to reduce total agency cost. Jensen and Meckling highlighted the role
of covenants imposed in the lending contract as a market control mechanism.45
Through the covenants, lenders can monitor firm performance and, at an early sign
of distress, can bring management to the table, control its risk-taking behaviour and,
38 Williams (2015).
39 Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986, s. 7.
40 Finch (1992), at p. 194.
41 Finch (1990), at pp. 385–389.
42 Finch (1992), at p. 195 (discussing the role of the DTI; but the same criticisms have been made of the
Insolvency Service, the executive branch of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, currently
responsible for disqualification).
43 Including Deregulation Act, Schedule 6, Part 4, which provides the Secretary of State and the Official
Receiver with the right to obtain information on director conduct from third parties, the Small Business,
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s.106, inserting new factors to be considered in every
disqualification case, and the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s.110, entitling the
Secretary of State to apply to court for a compensation order or to obtain a compensation undertaking
from a disqualified director.
44 Hicks (2001), at p. 442.
45 Jensen and Meckling (1976), at pp. 337–339.
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if necessary, force the company into an insolvency process to realise the assets and
distribute the proceeds. Thus, creditors are able to strengthen their position through
the lending contract. Following Jensen and Meckling, expenditure on negotiating
covenants and monitoring, together with any residual loss to creditors to the extent
that excessively risk-taking behaviour is not eliminated completely constitute the
agency costs of debt. When the monitoring provisions of the lending contract are
coupled with the shift towards creditor interests in English law, they balance the
strong incentives which UK listed company directors have to protect their reputation
in the market for directors and to protect their equity value at risk, so that the benefit
of these self-help steps in tackling risk-taking behaviour and reducing the residual
loss to creditors makes it worth bearing the cost of taking them. Total agency costs
are reduced and, overall, the system could be said to be in an approximate balance
or equilibrium. But, as we shall see, new market changes may destabilise this
delicate eco system.
3 Market Changes
3.1 Private Equity
Thus far, we have described only one type of large company with widely dispersed
shareholders. However, since the 1990s, the private equity industry has exploded
onto the scene in the UK. The private equity firm regularly raises funds from widely
dispersed shareholders. Each fund is invested in the private equity limited
partnership (with the private equity firm providing the general partner). The limited
partnership will acquire companies (‘portfolio companies’) either in public
company takeovers or through auctions or private purchases, funding the purchase
through comparatively small amounts of equity and significant amounts of debt (so
that these purchases are known as leveraged buyouts or ‘LBOs’). The private equity
firm then trades the business for a few years, with a view to selling it to a new buyer
or re-listing it on the stock exchange and returning a profit to the investors.46 The
private equity model thus transforms widely dispersed share ownership into a new
form of concentrated share ownership.
The private equity director is often hired for his particular expertise in a given
market.47 There may not be a broad market for this director’s skills, and attractive
vacancies may emerge comparatively infrequently. The director’s ‘payoff’ may be
highly dependent on the results of the particular firm in which he invests time and
effort, and he may attach more weight to direct compensation than to reputation
when compared with the professional director. Private equity houses are adept at
aligning their interests and those of management in pursuing a clear business plan to
achieve an exit from the investment in a relatively short period of time (often
somewhere between 5 and 7 years after purchase),48 and both parties are offered the
46 Gullifer and Payne (2015), at p. 768.
47 Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2009), at p. 132.
48 Bratton (2008), at p. 511.
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prospect of a relatively quick but significant financial return.49 Management in
private equity situations is likely to have a significant proportion of its remuneration
tied up in shares in the business, and often work with single-minded focus towards
the proposed exit. We might expect, therefore, to find the shareholder-creditor
agency problem to be particularly acute when a private equity portfolio company is
in financial distress. But, as we shall see, changes in restructuring practice produce
new and perhaps intuitively surprising agency problems in these companies.
3.2 Restructuring Practice
The traditional view of the shareholder-creditor agency problem in distress in
widely held public companies was developed at a time when a few large deposit-
taking or ‘clearing’ banks provided the bulk of finance to corporate Britain.50
Financial covenants in the lending agreement tested, on an ongoing basis or
periodically, whether the borrower’s financial health was being maintained (for
example, by testing that balance sheet value was maintained at not less than a stated
amount, or that the ratio of financial indebtedness to tangible net worth remained
within prescribed levels).51 If the testing process revealed that a financial covenant
had been breached, the borrower and the lender(s) (ordinarily a single bank or a
small group of banks) would meet to discuss what to do next. Typically, the banks
would commission an accountancy firm to produce an independent business review
(IBR) of the company’s financial and operational position. The banks would then
determine whether a restructuring was possible, or whether the company should be
placed in a formal insolvency process and (ideally) its business and assets or (at
least) its assets sold, and the proceeds distributed.52
Until comparatively recently, if a restructuring could be agreed in the UK, it
involved extension of repayment dates, relaxation of covenant levels or of other
aspects of the testing regime, and sales of non-core parts of the business in order to
pay down some debt. Agreement would usually be reached out of court and by
contract.53 Where a restructuring could not be agreed, management failings were
likely to be implicated in the collapse, for example, because managers had expanded
firms too quickly, had failed to recognise changed market conditions, had not
demonstrated sufficient commitment to the business, or lacked knowledge or
ability.54 Directors knew that if measures could not be agreed, or were not
successful, formal insolvency would follow, and they would lose their jobs and their
equity in the company. Crucially, their currency in the market for directors would
likely be depreciated, making it very difficult for them to secure another role. In
other words, their incentives were closely aligned with those of the shareholders in
49 Cheffins and Armour (2007), at pp. 7–9 and 27; Gilson and Whitehead (2008), at p. 235; Jensen
(1989), at pp. 69–70.
50 Armour et al. (2002), at pp. 1772–1773.
51 McKnight (2008), at pp. 149–151.
52 Segal (1992), Ch. 8.
53 Armour and Frisby (2001), at p. 93.
54 Stein (1985), at p. 380.
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preferring continuation of the company wherever possible, the shareholder-creditor
agency problem was broadly as described in the first part of this article and the
agency cost analysis holds good.
In the last decade, private equity companies have raised more debt relative to the
amount of equity invested than a typical listed company.55 Often this debt is divided
into layers or ‘tranches’, with some senior debt which commands a relatively low
interest rate but which ranks first on an insolvency, and some debt ranking behind
the senior debt on an insolvency (in other words, junior or subordinated to it) but
commanding a higher interest rate.56 During the recent recession, many opera-
tionally sound companies struggled to meet large debt service bills, or found that
they could not refinance at the same multiple of their earnings when their debt
matured.57 Whereas a traditional restructuring of a large corporate did not implicate
a restructuring of its debt (other than, possibly, extending maturity dates or
amending terms such as financial covenant testing ratios), in these highly leveraged
situations the most obvious solution was often to swap some of the financial
liabilities for equity. In this way, lenders retained a residual interest in the firm and
were able to capture any improvement in financial performance after the
deleveraging, but the company was not saddled with ongoing debt liabilities which
absorbed all of its free cash.
Moreover, a specialist market for investing in distressed situations is now well
established.58 Distressed debt investors buy debt at a discount to the face value of
the debt, with a view to profiting when a debt restructuring is in prospect or is
implemented. As a result, if a traditional bank lender is not convinced by the case
for a restructuring but the distressed debt investors are, the bank is able to sell its
debt claim at a predictable loss rather than taking the risk of insolvency enforcement
and sale. Once those who do not want to support the company have traded out and
those who see profit in a restructuring have traded in, the debt-for-equity swap can
be implemented.59 These distressed debt investors require timely and significant
profit to meet the expectations of their own investors.60 Some will sell quickly, once
debt prices trade up on the prospect of a restructuring. Others will have a longer-
term plan to hold the equity and make significant profit by re-listing the company or
selling it once the market or the business has recovered. But even these longer-term
investors will expect to achieve an exit in a comparatively small number of single
digit years.
This new environment has several implications for the agency analysis. First,
although the new environment brings new challenges (such as identifying who is
holding the company’s debt),61 arguably the prospects for a successful rehabilitation
55 ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (2014), at p. 12. For more detail on the role of
debt in private equity, see Gullifer and Payne (2015), at pp. 788–790.
56 McKnight (2008), at pp. 882–884.
57 Takacs (2010), at pp. 5–6.
58 Paterson (2014), at pp. 337–338.
59 Harner (2006), at pp. 70–119.
60 Ibid., at pp. 103–104.
61 Howard and Hedger (2014), at p. 298, para. 6.20.
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of the business after a debt restructuring implemented via legal process have
improved from the days when funding was provided exclusively by bank lenders
and the only options were amendment of loan terms or a sale of the business and
assets and distribution of the proceeds. Crucially, the debt-for-equity swap will
immediately ease the company’s liquidity pressures and will often free up cash for
investment and growth. Directors may therefore see a debt restructuring as
improving the company’s prospects and, if they can retain their jobs, implicitly their
own. Secondly, the cause of the financial difficulty is often an inappropriate capital
structure imposed by the investors in the business and not the directors, so that the
directors are not implicated in the company’s problems,62 Creditors may therefore
be content for the directors to continue in post after the debt restructuring. Thirdly, it
becomes necessary to value the business in order to determine how far down the
capital structure equity should be distributed in the debt-for-equity swap, and in
what proportions.63 This valuation will be dependent on management’s business
plan and projections for the company,64 and, as we have seen, the English court pays
deference to the commercial judgment of the directors. Finally, distressed debt
investors will wish to align their interests with those of management in order to
secure a successful exit, just as the original shareholders did before them. For all of
these reasons, the directors may be offered a significant equity stake, ranking behind
less debt, if the debt-for-equity swap is implemented.
Here is the nub of the matter. Whilst in the traditional analysis the director’s only
hope of making a recovery was to renegotiate the company’s lending arrangements,
retain his equity, ranking behind a significant amount of debt, and maintain his
currency in the market for directors and thus the ability to be appointed to another
listed company role, many modern debt-for-equity swap restructuring proposals
may offer the industry-specialist director a more attractive solution. If the director
takes the new equity on offer in the new restructuring, he will have a good stake in a
deleveraged company, ranking behind considerably less debt; possibly a once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity to make a significant amount of money. English insolvency law
does not prohibit this allocation of equity to the director, and the delicate balance
maintained between shareholders and creditors in the listed company situation
achieved through the incentive to retain equity and concern for reputation on one
side of the scales and common law and statutory obligations to creditors on the other
has fundamentally shifted. In many highly leveraged private equity situations, the
director’s equity stake is more likely to have value if the initial valuation of the
business is as low as possible, so that as much debt (ranking ahead of the equity) as
possible is written down.65 There is little to incentivise a director to think about
shareholders and/or junior creditors at all when market re-employment prospects
might be low and his financial and career returns are best improved by backing the
senior creditors’ horse. This imposes new agency costs on the shareholders to the
extent that the directors prefer the creditor-led restructuring plan and the low
62 Takacs (2010), at p. 24.
63 Clark (1981), at p. 1252.
64 Paterson (2014), at p. 353.
65 Howard and Hedger (2014), at pp. 276–277, paras. 5116–5119.
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valuation which supports it, even where the shareholders may be able to argue for a
residual economic interest in the company. In this situation, if the law mandates
replacement of shareholder interests with creditor interests before the onset of
insolvency, the scales are simply tipped more dramatically in favour of creditors.
Paradoxically, the greater the extent to which shareholders have aligned their
interests with those of the director through equity compensation when times are
good, the greater the director’s incentive to prefer a creditor-led restructuring plan
(and a low valuation for the company) in distress.
We might expect that the private equity sponsor would rely on independent or
nominee appointees to the portfolio company board to reduce total agency costs. As
these directors rely on the private equity house for appointment and are unlikely to
be offered compensation in a creditor-led debt restructuring, they might be expected
to favour the interests of the private equity sponsor over creditor interests, and to
argue for a more optimistic business plan supporting a higher valuation for the
company. However, in their survey, Cornelli and Karakas¸ find evidence of few
independent directors in private equity companies.66 They cite Kaplan and
Stro¨mberg’s suggestion that modern private equity firms ‘often hire professionals
with operating backgrounds and an industry focus’.67 It is the case that sometimes
the private equity sponsor will place its own nominee, or nominees, on the board of
directors. However, Cornelli and Karakas¸ have shown that private equity firms will
not always put a nominee on the board because the private equity sponsor does not
have limitless resources and because there is a trade-off between the costs of making
the appointment and the benefits of doing so.68 Whether a nominee is appointed or
not may depend, amongst other things, on the complexity of the case, the strategy
for the investment and the approach to governance of the particular private equity
house (Cornelli and Karakas¸ remind us that ‘it might be misleading to think about a
private equity modus operandi with the assumption that all private equity firms have
the same approach’).69 Moreover, and significantly, Cornelli and Karakas¸ find a
lower level of private equity sponsor nominees on boards where ‘leverage’, or the
ratio of debt to equity, is higher.70 They tentatively conclude that these may be what
they call ‘financial engineering deals’: in other words, deals where success is
dependent on the capital structure chosen for the acquisition, with high levels of
debt at low rates of interest, rather than on bringing about operational change. Yet,
we also know that high leverage may increase the prospect that the company will
face financial distress in the future.71
Significantly, Cornelli and Karakas¸ also show that where the sponsor does have a
nominee on the board, management still tends to command more votes.72 In other
words, the private equity nominee does not control the board, and even if the private
66 Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2012), at p. 12.
67 Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2009), at p. 32.
68 Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2012), at p. 20.
69 Ibid., at p. 3.
70 Ibid., at p. 3.
71 Kaplan and Stein (1993), at p. 347.
72 Ibid., at p. 13.
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equity sponsor has appointed a nominee, this is unlikely to eliminate the risk of self-
interested decision making by the majority of the board. If, once the company is
distressed, shareholders exercise their powers to remove directors so as to address
agency problems, they risk prompting lenders to take action to accelerate their debt
and seize control of the business through an administrator, notwithstanding that the
covenant breach entitling the lenders to do so may fall far short of actual cash flow
insolvency absent an actual acceleration. Moreover, nominee board members may
become concerned about their personal liability in a legal architecture built around
the concept of a shift in duty towards creditors, so that replacement nominees are
likely to require expensive indemnities, if a candidate can be found at all.73 And the
shareholders expose themselves to arguments that they have acted as so-called
shadow directors of the company and that they are also responsible for wrongful
trading.74 Overall, the cost of these steps to address the agency problem may be too
high relative to the prospects of eliminating creditor bias in the board’s decision-
making process and, therefore, to the anticipated reduction in the shareholders’
residual loss.75 As Easterbrook and Fischel explain, the ‘trick’ is to keep total
agency costs as low as possible.76 If one agency cost does not reduce another which
it is designed to tackle, or not by much, then it will not be worth incurring.
New agency costs may also arise between different classes of financial creditor.
Just as senior creditors, supported by the directors, may advance a low valuation for
the company in order to grab the lion’s share of the equity from the shareholders, so
senior creditors and the directors may argue that the valuation is such that the junior
creditors no longer have an economic interest in the company. Junior creditors may
not be able to control for this agency cost in their lending contract with the senior
creditors at any price. This is because the senior creditors may only be willing to
allow more debt to be raised on the basis that it is on subordinated terms, set out in a
contract between the senior and junior lenders known as an intercreditor agreement.
Amongst other things, it is likely that the junior creditors will have passed the power
to control enforcement to a specified majority of the senior creditors, until the senior
creditors have been repaid in full, and, possibly, will have agreed that they will not
enforce other rights (potentially even the right to receive interest) for a period of
time.77 This issue is exacerbated by the lack of authority around the meaning of
‘interests of creditors’ in section 172(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. Recent cases
have conceptualised it as ‘creditors as a whole’.78 Yet, the application of this
standard is murky where more than one class of financial creditor is implicated, and
leaves ample room for directors to justify a preference for senior creditor value as
the first value at risk, where self-interest is in reality the motivating factor.
73 Stapledon (1996), at pp. 125–126.
74 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214(7).
75 Stapledon (1996), at p. 127 (discussing other types of intervention, but making the same point about
risk and reward).
76 Easterbrook and Fischel (1996), at p. 10.
77 Howard and Hedger (2014), at p. 56, para. 2.106, p. 347, para. 6.212, and pp. 354–356, para. 6.237.
78 Re Pantone 485 Ltd [2002] 1 BCLC 266.
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It is also worth mentioning in passing that the picture may be even more
complicated than these two broad scenarios. In some cases the shareholder may
regard its best chance of salvaging something from the situation to lie in injecting
new liquidity into the business in the form of a new equity subscription.79 As this
will be equity in the newly deleveraged company, the shareholder hopes to profit
alongside the distressed debt investors and the directors when the company is listed
or sold, or another exit strategy is pursued. Yet, this can lead to quite byzantine
negotiations. Where the senior lenders are leading the restructuring plan, supported
by the directors, the shareholders may seek to align themselves with this group,
excluding the junior creditors. Indeed, ideally the shareholder whose strategy is to
make a return through a new equity injection would prefer its equity to rank behind
as little debt as possible, and would prefer a deep debt-for-equity swap. In this case,
a complex shareholder and senior creditor vs. junior creditor agency problem may
arise, with the former group capturing directorial support for their plan and then
advancing a low value for the company supported by the directors’ business plan,
whilst the junior creditors maintain that they have a continuing economic interest.
But in other cases it is possible that the junior creditors will have a good case for an
equity allocation in the debt-for-equity swap, so that the shareholders need to obtain
their support for the liquidity injection. Thus, all sorts of strategies may be in play,
and it is difficult to make generalisations about how stakeholders will interact as the
analysis becomes highly case specific.
3.3 Some Empirical Support
One of the challenges with research in this area is the difficulty of investigating
behavioural differences, still less quantifying them. Yet, there is a risk that without
any empirical research the assumptions about transactions will remain a matter of
anecdote and hypothesis. In order to go some small way to addressing this issue, a
hand-picked data set of restructurings of large and larger mid-cap English groups
between 2008 and 2013 was built, using a variety of sources, particularly the
restructuring deal lists published by Debtwire (an online provider of information on
corporate debt situations), press reports, announcements from participants in the
transaction and details of certain of the transactions in the European Debt
Restructuring Handbook.80 The data set comprised 52 restructuring situations. The
cases were then examined to establish whether they resulted in a debt-for-equity
swap, a formal insolvency process or some other outcome. Where a formal
insolvency process (such as a pre-packaged administration) was used to transfer
equity ownership of the business to the lenders, the transaction was classified as a
debt-for-equity swap and not an insolvency proceeding.81 Where a debt-for-equity
swap, or a transaction which produced a functionally equivalent outcome, was
identified, sources were reviewed to establish whether management received an
79 Takacs (2010), at p. 15.
80 Asimacopoulos and Bickle (2013).
81 This is because, whilst the transaction is substantively an insolvency, functionally it produces a debt-
for-equity swap in which some lenders emerge holding equity in a new holding company for the business.
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equity allocation or not, or whether that was unknown. Where possible, the size of
any management equity allocation was noted. Some data were cross-checked with
information available on the English Companies House’s new, free Beta Service,
but it often proved difficult to identify the ultimate parent company in a corporate
group, and in many cases where it was identified, the ultimate parent was not
incorporated in England and Wales and so did not file accounts or annual returns
there. Specialist finance structures such as structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and
collateralised mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) were not included in the list.
Where research indicated a formal insolvency process (other than those processes
used to implement a transaction functionally equivalent to a debt-for-equity swap),
management was assumed to have made no return. The purpose was not to
undertake a full-scale empirical study, but rather to provide just enough empirical
facts to ground the discussion in this article, and the results are set out in the
table below.
Company
type
Outcome Management equity
allocation?
Size of management equity
allocation
Debt-
for-
equity
swap
Insolvency Other Yes No Unknown 5–10 % 10.1–20 % Unknown
Listed 5 9 5 2 10 7 1 1
PE 22 2 2 9 2 15 5 1 4
Other 1 4 2 4 3
Notwithstanding their limitations, several things are striking about the data. First,
in many listed company cases the company entered a formal insolvency process. A
range of other outcomes was identified, including takeovers at a low price, rescue
rights issues and refinancing, but the data set included only two cases in which the
directors appear to have supported a creditor-led debt-for-equity swap in a listed
company. In the first of these cases, shareholders were offered the chance to vote to
accept the transaction at a value which would have seen them recover 1 English
penny per share. The shareholders voted against the deal, but it was implemented
via a pre-packaged administration sale of the business and assets to a new company
owned by the lenders, with management reported to have acquired a 20% stake in
the post-restructuring equity.
The second case concerned Hibu, a yellow pages directories business in the UK.
In 2013, it announced a debt-for-equity swap implemented via an insolvency sale
pursuant to which large fund investors would take control and its shareholders
would be wiped out. The Hibu shareholders formed an action group and wrote an
open letter in which they explained that they would be asking the board to
demonstrate that they had acted in shareholders’ best interests throughout the
process. The letter stated:
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‘… [W]e note that [the directors] have paid themselves bonuses from
shareholder funds and appear to have negotiated themselves new contracts
with the creditor group. We will need comfort that throughout this process it
was shareholders’ interests and not self interest that was uppermost in their
minds.’
A newspaper report in September 2013 listed the shareholder grievances,
including that allowing the executive directors to remain in position after the shares
were suspended seemed ‘too cosy’.82 Hibu’s Chairman and its Chief Executive
resigned following completion of the financial restructuring. There is evidence here
both of reluctance by professional listed company directors to attract shareholder
ire, and of coordinated shareholder action.
When we come to the private equity cases, the situation is very different. The
overwhelming majority of cases proceeded by way of debt-for-equity swap, and in
many it has been possible to identify positively a management equity allocation. In
most of the cases it was challenging to determine the size of the equity allocation,
although of those cases where it could be identified 5 were in the 5–10% range
(most around 10%) and 1 was in a higher range. Once again, this is only a very
partial picture, and the claims made for the data are not great. For example, the data
do not identify when the directors were appointed to the board, their individual
characteristics, the amount of debt on the balance sheet pre and post restructuring
and the valuation for the company, whether the post-restructuring equity was
divided into different classes of share, or the economics attaching to management’s
stake. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the need to approach the data with an
awareness of their limitations, they are interesting in supporting the picture that
debt-for-equity swaps with an allocation of equity to management have become a
regular feature of leveraged buyout restructurings. Notably, the number of formal
insolvencies in this group is very low. Only two cases were identified in which the
company successfully refinanced, and in one of these cases lenders were provided
with some control rights.
4 Impact of Market Changes on the Traditional View
This leads us to the question of whether English corporate law should seek to reduce
the agency costs of restructuring by limiting the risk of creditor bias in the board’s
decision-making process. The risk that managers may be incentivised to support
creditors when the firm is financially distressed if they are to receive equity in the
restructured business has been identified in the English cases. In Re Bluebrook (also
known as IMO Carwash), the junior creditors argued that a debt restructuring in
which only senior creditors would receive equity was unfair because the value of the
group’s assets was greater than the value of the senior debt.83 Mr Justice Mann
specifically noted that a majority of the board was transferring to the new group
82 Spanier (2013).
83 Re Bluebrook Ltd [2010] B.C.C 209.
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(which was to be owned by the senior lenders), with a bonus plan.84 However, he
fell back on a device commonly used to defend against agency problems: the
independent director. Two of the directors were not transferring to the new group
but had approved the deal.
In recent times it has been increasingly common for creditors to request that an
individual with experience of financial distress is appointed to the board of a
troubled company to provide advice to the other directors. But the creditors are
likely to have influence regarding the identity of the appointee, and the specialist
manager taking a board appointment in a period of distress is likely to be conscious
of the need for repeated interaction with the creditor body.85 Like the professional
non-executive director, the ‘turnaround director’ is likely to place great currency on
his reputation in the market for turnaround directors, but in this case on his
reputation with the creditors rather than with the shareholders. We might, therefore,
expect this group to put more weight on reputation than some of the other groups,
but reputation for delivering an acceptable result for the major creditors. Even
between creditor interests, an independent turnaround director may not deliver the
protection which the appointment might be seen to promise. It would be a
particularly courageous individual who would stand in the way of a debt
restructuring which commands sufficient senior creditor and board support to be
implemented, and who would advance the interests of a weaker constituency that
lacked the bargaining power to protect itself. Indeed, a turnaround director who
adopted this course would be wise to worry about his future employment prospects.
In Re Bluebrook, the junior lenders argued (although apparently tentatively) that
the board should have considered alternative transactions which would have
produced a return for the senior and the junior creditors. Mr Justice Mann expressed
concern with the practical realities of the situation, which appears, in turn, to have
forced Counsel for the junior lenders into arguing for a negotiating position based
on the fact that the senior lenders would never have contemplated an insolvency
sale, so that the board could simply have refused to take any action unless some
value was attributed to the junior lenders.86 Put in these terms, the argument looks
rather stark, and Mr Justice Mann concluded: ‘This is not to say that the board had
no negotiating position at all. It did not have to do whatever the senior lenders
wanted. But it was not in a position to bargain for some return to other creditors if
the senior lenders resisted that’.87
Yet, even if the valuation evidence in Bluebrook could not sustain a challenge,
the junior lenders’ arguments do reveal some of the difficulties with which this
article is concerned. First, it is not possible to arrive at a single assumption about the
way in which directors will behave when a company is financially distressed to
which the law responds. Instead, what is needed is a flexible approach which can
adapt to the particular circumstances of the case. Secondly, one scenario is that in a
modern restructuring case the directors may have their own reasons for preferring
84 Ibid., at [63].
85 Baird (2006), at p. 1235.
86 Re Bluebrook Ltd [2010] B.C.C 209, at [59].
87 Ibid., at [61].
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creditors over shareholders, or certain creditor interests over others, even when
shareholders or junior creditors, or both, have some economic interest in the
company, so that legal rules which entitle directors to give primacy to senior
creditor interests may exacerbate, rather than address, emerging agency costs. And
finally, self-help measures to control the total agency costs of restructuring may be
too expensive relative to their benefit or not practically available at all, so that there
is a good case for corporate law to respond.
In another context, Andrew Keay has made a persuasive theoretical case for an
entity maximisation and sustainability approach to directors’ duties in English law,
or ‘EMS’.88 EMS does not require directors to attempt to identify and focus on
particular stakeholders in determining how to balance different options or
considerations, but rather mandates a single objective of maximising the long-run
value of the company. However, in doing so, directors must also have regard to
‘sustainability’, used here in the purely financial sense in which Keay uses it,
involving ‘both the survival of the company, namely the company does not fall into
an insolvent position from which it cannot escape, and the continuing development
of the financial strength of the company’.89 EMS would seem to offer a promising
standard against which to judge directors’ decision-making in a debt restructuring.
First, where we are considering a large debt restructuring, by way of either a
debt-for-equity swap or a rescue rights issue or distressed takeover of a listed
company, we do want the directors to consider whether the restructuring is the best
transaction for the company as a whole, or whether there is another transaction
which will maximise the value of the company for a greater number of stakeholders,
but which is also feasible and sustainable. In Re Bluebrook, Mr Justice Mann was
sceptical that there was such a role for the directors, given the valuation evidence
that was before the board and the fact that the junior lenders were well organised
and arguing for themselves.90 However, with respect, this does not provide a
complete answer.
The board is the guardian of the business plan which will be fundamental to the
valuation exercise. Given the evidence of this article, we should be mindful of the
range of incentives which operates on directors in a modern case. We should
incentivise directors, in setting the business plan, not to be so cautious that those
who are rolled into the restructuring transaction receive ‘too good a deal’,91 but at
the same time not to be so optimistic that those low in the capital structure get a
chance to make a recovery at the expense of the claims of those higher up, or that
shareholders are persuaded to invest in a rescue rights issue when in reality there is
no real equity story for the business. The entity maximisation and sustainability
approach works well as a test here: in setting the business plan the directors should
attempt to maximise the value of the company for all its stakeholders, but not in an
excessively risky fashion. It provides directors with a clear way to think about their
obligations in producing the company’s strategic plan. Crucially, at a time when it
88 Keay (2005b); Keay (2008).
89 Keay (2008), at p. 691.
90 Re Bluebrook Ltd [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch); [2010] B.C.C. 209, at [56].
91 Ibid., at [49].
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may be very difficult to identify who has an economic interest and who does not,
EMS does not require directors to satisfy particular stakeholder interests where there
are other, sustainable, solutions to create value for a larger number of stakeholders.
It therefore also goes some way to removing directors’ preferences from the
decision-making process: a defensive response that directors’ behaviour is justified
in (senior) creditors’ best interests is replaced with a test which assesses ‘principled
decision making independent of the personal preferences of managers and directors’
in reviewing the basis on which the directors arrived at the forecasts in the business
plan.92 Moreover, the test should work reasonably well whatever the particular
incentives of the directors. This means that it is also more future-proof as the mix of
shareholders in publicly traded companies in the UK continues to diversify, and
some of the reputational bonding mechanisms explored in the article come under
pressure in that context.
However, merely implementing a new standard without adopting a new standard
of judicial scrutiny is unlikely to have any significant effect on the agency costs of
restructuring. In Re Bluebrook, Mr Justice Mann expressed frustration at how late
the case against the directors was put, and how weakly it was articulated.93 Yet, we
have already seen that a successful challenge is likely to require the claimant to
adduce evidence that the directors acted in bad faith, and thus to challenge their
honesty. This is obviously a serious allegation, which in England implicates
professional conduct standards for Counsel advancing it, and appears to have
resulted in allegations being made against directors in vague and half-hearted terms.
It is suggested that the solution to this problem lies in the English court adopting an
enhanced level of scrutiny, in lieu of the Charterbridge test, in assessing debt
restructuring transactions where a majority of the board is to receive an equity
allocation in the debt restructuring. Something might usefully be learnt here from
the approach of the Delaware courts in the field of takeovers, where directors may
also be acting out of self-interest in defending a hostile bid, or in promoting the
interests of one bidder over another. Time and space do not permit a full review
here, but the point with which we are particularly concerned is the court’s approach
to its review. Where the circumstances are enough to suggest that director self-
interest might be a motivating factor, in certain cases the Delaware courts have not
required the claimant to prove, as a threshold condition, that the directors were
acting in bad faith.94 Instead, the courts have conducted an initial enquiry to
establish whether the usual deference to the board’s decision making in US law
should apply. This is achieved by placing the initial burden of proof on the directors
to show that they complied with their duties. Applying this to a debt restructuring in
which the directors are to receive an equity allocation, the English courts would
require the directors to establish that they pursued an EMS approach in preparing
the business plan. Notwithstanding concerns about judicial intervention,95 we are
92 Jensen (Jensen 2010), at p. 17.
93 Ibid., at [54]–[55].
94 Unocal Copr. v Mesa Petroleum Co 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), discussed in Bainbridge (2013).
95 Belcredi and Ferrarini (2013), at p. 17.
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concerned here with the production of a business plan and the selection of a
particular transaction, rather than second-guessing commercial decisions made in
the course of business with the benefit of hindsight. In other words, it is suggested
that the worst concerns with judicial scrutiny would not apply if, where a debt-for-
equity swap is proposed in which the directors are to receive an equity allocation,
the directors’ obligation to prepare a business plan in a way which maximises the
value of the company and is sustainable were accompanied by an enhanced level of
judicial scrutiny of their decision making.
It is also suggested that shareholders should think about corporate governance
issues not only for good times, but also to protect themselves against a flight of
loyalty if the business becomes distressed. Paradoxically, the more closely
shareholders align compensation incentives when the company is trading profitably,
the more the director may be incentivised to switch allegiance if the company
becomes financially distressed. Thus, the very mechanism by which shareholders
reinforce loyalty in good times may hasten a switch of loyalty in bad times, at least
in certain types of company. As we have seen, there will be a cost-benefit analysis to
be undertaken in determining the composition of the board, so that it will not always
be feasible or desirable to add independent or nominee directors to a board; and, in
any event, as we have seen, unless the independent and nominee directors constitute
a majority of the board, they are unlikely to significantly reduce total agency costs
of restructuring.
It is suggested here that soft action in terms of ‘relationship building’ may
provide part of the answer. The risk-shifting incentive arises because of the
powerful single-minded focus of management on its payoff from equity incentive
schemes and, it has been suggested, is greatest for industry experts for whom the
exit opportunity offers perhaps a once-in-a-lifetime chance of significant financial
reward. Whilst this single-minded focus can be highly effective, it is suggested here
that there is also a need for shareholders to build a relationship of trust and loyalty
with directors who see a long-term future with them and are thus incentivised to
protect shareholder interest if the firm is wounded but not fatally so. It is suggested
that detailed governance considerations will become increasingly important for
private equity firms and for those who invest in them. It is also something which the
more heterogeneous shareholder body in listed companies will need to get to grips
with.
5 Conclusion
In a publicly traded company, shareholders face a series of agency problems
because their incentives may not be the same as the incentives of the directors.
English commercial law provides a range of solutions to agency problems,
particularly by imposing duties on directors. However, in practice, the English
courts are reluctant to second-guess directorial decision making and so the market
has also developed solutions to the agency problem. A classic solution is to
reinforce reputational concerns and to align shareholder and director interests
through compensation. The traditional analysis shows how this close alignment of
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shareholder and director interests may give rise to another agency problem in
financial distress: the shareholder-creditor agency problem. Put shortly, the more
shareholder and director interests are aligned when the company is solvent, the
greater the incentive for directors to prefer shareholder interests when the company
is financially distressed (even if the shareholders have no residual economic value in
the company). English law responds to this problem by imposing obligations on
directors to consider creditor interests. Once again, though, there are limitations to
the solutions offered by the law, and so creditors also respond to the issue by
imposing covenants in the lending contract. Together, the shift in duty at law and
the contractual protections balance the incentives for directors to prefer shareholder
interests.
Modern cases introduce new, and complicated, dynamics. The growth of the
private equity industry means that many large companies are now privately owned
by private equity sponsors, and have raised significant amounts of debt relative to
equity. Private equity sponsors may also have a preference for industry-specialist
directors. Together these mean that both the type of director and the type of
transaction which is contemplated in financial distress are likely to be different.
Crucially, the restructuring plan may very well offer directors the prospect of an
equity allocation ranking behind less debt, so that industry-specialist directors with
few prospects of alternative employment may be incentivised to support it in
circumstances where there is a still a residual interest for other financial creditors or
shareholders. Paradoxically, this incentive may be greater the more closely
directorial compensation incentives are aligned with those of the shareholders.
Moreover, complex relationships between directors, shareholders and different
classes of creditors may emerge. A limited amount of empirical evidence from
English cases goes some way to supporting the thesis, although there is undoubtedly
considerable further research which could usefully be done, for example, in a
detailed comparison of the returns to management and the returns to different
classes of creditors and to the shareholders.
Once we understand how directors may behave in a modern restructuring case,
and the range of different behaviours, we may wish to revisit our approach to the
duties at law of directors when a financially distressed company is undertaking a
restructuring transaction. This article has suggested that we should replace tests
which assume that creditor interests supplant shareholder interests or which impose
a vague obligation to act in the interests of ‘creditors as a whole’, with a test
(modelled on the US test) of whether the directors have sought to maximise the
value of the company for all the stakeholders in preparing the business plan and
projections on which the debt restructuring is based, and in pursuing the particular
transaction before the court. This does not require the directors to be excessively
cautious or excessively ambitious; a middle ground is required. Perhaps more
significantly, this article has suggested a heightened level of judicial scrutiny when
director self-interest is in prospect in a debt restructuring and, crucially, that
directors’ decision making in this area should be capable of being impugned without
demonstrating bad faith or a lack of honesty. The article has suggested that the worst
concerns with judicial review of commercial decision making do not arise here,
because we are not focused on second-guessing business decisions with the benefit
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of hindsight but rather on a contemporaneous review of the business plan and
projections, and the decision to pursue one transaction rather than a different one.
But it has also suggested that the review of directorial incentives holds lessons for
all institutional shareholders, particularly in how they approach board composition
and their relationships with the board.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
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